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Background: Vandervert described how, in collaboration with the cerebral cortex, unconscious learning of cerebellar
internal models leads to enhanced executive control in working memory in expert music performance and in scientific
discovery. Following Vandervert’s arguments, it is proposed that since music performance and scientific discovery,
two pillars of cultural learning and advancement, are learned through in cerebellar internal models, it is reasonable that
additional if not all components of culture may be learned in the same way. Within this perspective strong evidence
is presented that argues that the learning, maintenance, and advancement of culture are accomplished primarily
by recently-evolved (the last million or so years) motor/cognitive functions of the cerebellum and not primarily by the
cerebral cortex as previously assumed. It is suggested that the unconscious cerebellar mechanism behind the origin
and learning of culture greatly expands Ito’s conception of the cerebellum as “a brain for an implicit self.”
Results: Through the mechanism of predictive sequence detection in cerebellar internal models related to the body,
other persons, or the environment, it is shown how individuals can unconsciously learn the elements of culture and yet,
at the same time, be in social sync with other members of culture. Further, this predictive, cerebellar mechanism of
socialization toward the norms of culture is hypothesized to be diminished among children who experience
excessive television viewing, which results in lower grades, poor socialization, and diminished executive control.
Conclusion: It is concluded that the essential components of culture are learned and sustained not by the cerebral
cortex alone as many traditionally believe, but are learned through repetitious improvements in prediction and control
by internal models in the cerebellum. From this perspective, the following new explanations of culture are
discussed: (1) how culture can be learned unconsciously but yet be socially in sync with others, (2) how the
recent evolutionary expansion of the cerebellum was involved in the co-evolution of earliest stone tools and
language—leading to the cerebellum-driven origin of culture, (3) how cerebellar internal models are blended
to produce the creative, forward advances in culture, (4) how the blending of cerebellar internal models led
to human, multi-component, infinitely partitionable and communicable working memory, (5) how excessive
television viewing may represent a cultural shift that diminishes the observational learning of internal models
of the behavior of others and thus may result in a mild, parallel version of Schmahmann’s cerebellar cognitive
affective syndrome.
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Elsewhere I proposed how the learning of cerebellar in-
ternal models during music training enhances executive
processes in working memory and thereby can lead to sci-
entific discovery and therapeutic efficacy [1, 2]. In brief,
the following three-part unconscious cerebrocerebellar
mechanism was proposed to be behind the production of
high-level music performance and scientific contributions.
First, through the detection of sequences in repetitive
patterns during problem solving, the cerebellum uncon-
sciously learns error-driven internal models of all behav-
ioral, cognitive and affective processes that subsequently
contribute to goal attainment in working memory, and it
uses these internal models to adaptively optimize the
unconscious prediction and anticipation of similar future
environmental events. This first mechanism is based directly
on Akshoomoff, Courchesne and Townsend’s [3] and Leg-
gio and Molinari’s [4] mutually supportive conclusions on
the predictive, forward modeling role of the cerebellum in
both movement and cognitive control processes. These re-
searchers’ mutually (and independently) proposed relation-
ship between cerebellar sequence detection and the learning
of cerebellar internal models is clearly laid out in Leggio
and Molinari’s [4] cerebellar sequence detection hypothesis:
According to this hypothesis, the cerebellum detects
and simulates repetitive patterns of temporally or
spatially structured events, regardless of whether they
constitute sensory consequences of one’s actions in
motor planning, expected sensory stimuli in perceptual
prediction, or inferences of higher-order processes
(e.g., cognitive elaboration or social cognition). The
simulation allows internal models [italics added] to
be created that can be used to make predictions about
future events that involve any component, such as the
body, other persons, and the environment. (p. 36)
Cerebellar internal models are learned as a neuronal
circuits for the “forward-predictive” manipulation (con-
trol) of what in the cerebellum literature is referred to as
a “controlled object.” As Leggio and Molinari point out
in the above quote, such controlled objects include the
body (for example, in using the hands, legs, arms), other
persons (for example, in “controlling” the behavior of
others in communicating, teaching, negotiating and so
forth), and the environment (for example, everything
from using stone tools to playing the piano (and assimi-
lating the musical piece) to accessing information from
iPhones). Thus, with repetitious practice, forward-
predictive internal models in the cerebellum permit the
unconscious manipulation of the forgoing controlled ob-
jects toward the achievement of goals. We will return to
this learning of predictive cerebellar internal models in
relation to socialization toward the norms of culture1 in
more detail later in this article.
Second, within the framework of the forgoing cerebel-
lar sequence detection and prediction process, uncon-
scious cerebellar forward-predicting internal models are
adaptively blended [5] in new prediction-optimizing
ways during all problem solving, for example, in the cul-
ture components, music and science [1, 2]. Third, when
the resulting unconsciously learned new blends of
forward-predicting internal models are sent to con-
sciousness in working memory, they are often experi-
enced as sudden insight or intuition [1, 2]. These new
blends of forward-predicting internal models may both
advance the individual’s learning of the task at hand and
contribute newly expanded knowledge in the form of
innovation and creative discovery, for example, in music
and science. This overall three-part cerebro-cerebellar
mechanism of innovative and creative advancement may
be summarized in the phraseology Leggio and Molinari
[4] so aptly suggested in the title of their above-quoted
article on cerebellar sequence detection, namely, “Cere-
bellar Sequencing: a Trick for Predicting the Future.”
Purpose
If predictive sequence detection and blending in the
cerebellum’s internal models indeed play a foundational/
integral role in the above unconscious, step-by-step
cerebrocerebellar advances in scientific discovery and
expert musical performance, both highly sequence- or
rule-based forms of cultural knowledge and technology,
it then reasonably follows that cerebellar internal models
may likewise play a foundational role as the driving
mechanism behind many additional if not all aspects of
culture (see Endnotes). Within this perspective, the
purpose of this article is to propose how unconscious,
forward-predictive internal models learned in the
cerebellum may have played the dominant role both in
initiating the first moments of the evolution of culture
and in its further elaboration and advancement during
the subsequent approximately 190,000 years of prehis-
toric and historic development (for example, Powell,
Shennan & Thomas [6]). Specifically, it is argued that (1)
Only the human cerebellum has evolved the new special-
ized cognitive functions in the last million years by which
to unconsciously learn and refine the sharable, common
skills, bodies of knowledge, beliefs, and language that
through constant error-correction (Ito, [7, 8]); Leggio and
Molinari, [4]; Leiner, Leiner, & Dow, [9, 10]) come to com-
prise culture (Vandervert, [1, 11]), and (2) to share this
common, yet unconsciously learned culture, the skills,
knowledges, and affective basis of culture can only consist
of the learning of equally common context-independent2
cerebellar internal models among communicating humans
as described by Doya [12], Imamizu and Kawato [13],
Moberget, Gullesen, Andersson et al. [14] and Wolpert,
Doya and Kawato [15]. Following directly in the vein of
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these latter three researches, it is proposed that this
sharing of culture is accomplished through the learn-
ing of internal models of other persons as controlled
objects (see the earlier Leggio & Molinari [4] quote
and discussion). The tremendous, silent computational
power of the human cerebellum and its vast neural
connective relationship with the cerebral cortex will
be described below.
In solid, preliminary support of these two arguments,
Van Overwalle and Mariën [16] concluded that the cere-
bellum learns internal models for “social cognition” that
are constantly error-corrected and sent to the cerebral
cortex for the moment-to-moment, predictive “fluent
and automatic social interaction” (p. 16). Of course,
without social cognition, socialization toward encultur-
ation could not occur. Therefore, Van Overwalle and
Marien's conclusion comports with both Doya’s [12]
description of the cerebellar modeling of speakers and
listeners (including their nonverbal communication) as
mutual control objects and with the proposal presented in
this article that culture is adaptively driven by the learning
of just such cerebellar internal models during socialization
(see Endnotes). It is proposed that examples of this
socialization toward the norms of culture can be seen
in the repetitive, adaptive learning involved in the ac-
quisition of culture-specific constellations of music,
science, art, religion, and family practices for a par-
ticular culture; they are learned in cerebellar internal
models in the same way as described for music and
science by Vandervert [1], that is, in accordance with
Leggio and Molinari’s [4] predictive scenario outlined
in their above quote.
This new neuroanthropological perspective leads to the
following, perhaps bold, assertion: While the large human
cerebral cortex may have been the overwhelmingly domin-
ant organ of selective advantage in the highly context-
dependent world of natural selection that existed before
the advent of culture, with the advantageous evolutionary
enlargement of the cognitive regions of the cerebellum
and their tool-making and communications-related skills
(Vandervert, in press-a), the cerebellum increasingly be-
came the main driver behind the evolutionary advent of
culture and its continued advancing development. This
somewhat speculative new perspective extends Ito’s [8]
overall point in his book, “The Cerebellum: a brain for an
implicit self.” In his book, Ito explains that the meaning of
“an implicit self” derives from the fact that the cerebellum
performs its contributions unconsciously. And that, even
though learning to accomplish complex cognitive/
motor tasks is performed within conscious awareness,
when these tasks are refined through practice this
awareness is taken over by unconscious cerebellar in-
ternal models. Ito specifically described what he
meant by “implicit” as follows:
When we think about some topic repeatedly, the
thought becomes more and more implicit; that is, it
requires less and less conscious effort, as in intuition.
This suggests that the cerebellum aids the self in both
movement and thought, but covertly, by use of its
internal models. ([8], pp. viii-ix)
In this article, this “implicit” self is unconsciously
learned in direct relation to internal models of other
persons as cerebellar controlled objects in social com-
munication, including nonverbal communication (a la
Doya [12], Imamizu and Kawato [13], and Wolpert,
Doya and Kawato [15]), and thereby can be extended to
the likewise “implicit” or unconscious origin, subsequent
elaboration, and forward advance of culture.
Finally, implications of these arguments are followed
into research evidence on the effects of modern, infor-
mation technology-augmented culture and excessive
television viewing among children. Here, it is hypothesized
that since modern electronic devices (iPads, iPhones and
television particularly) remove much of the burden of
repetitious observational learning of cerebellar internal
models of other persons as controlled objects (Doya [12]),
cultural information is to a lesser degree being uncon-
sciously learned. This lessening of a conscious/uncon-
scious capacity to be in sync with cultural norms
regarding attentional control, belief, and compliance may
be seen in deficits in childhood education and psycho-
logical well-being which parallel those described in
Schmahmann’s [17–19] dysmetria of thought.
Traditional neuroscience approaches to the
evolution of culture
The definition of culture used here refers to the shared
beliefs and ways of doing things among the members of
a particular group of people which are learned through
socialization (see Endnotes). Others have proposed evo-
lutionary neuroscience-based and intelligence-based ex-
planations of the development of culture, for example,
Holloway [20, 21]; Reader, Hager and Laland [22]; van
Schick and Burkart [23]; Stout and Chaminade [24];
Whiten and van Schaik [25]. However, these researches
have not offered detailed brain mechanisms that would
offer (1) an explanation for how culture is uniquely
learned through repetitive experience during socialization,
or (2) an explanation of how such learning would dif-
ferentiate uniquely human culture from complex group
behavior among lower animals. For the reader who
wishes more background on the evolution of culture,
especially the evolution of how symbolic, linguistic, and
cultural capacities might have emerged and developed
in our species, Haidle, Bolus, Collard et al. [26] is
recommended.
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Bringing in the other four-fifths of the neurons of
the brain to more fully understand the evolution
of culture
In their watershed articles, Leiner, Leiner and Dow [9,
10] pointed out that the human cerebellum increased
three- to fourfold in last million years. They further
pointed out that this huge increase in size of the cerebel-
lum was linked by two-way nerve tracks (20 million on
each side of the brain) to the cerebral cortex, including
the parietal and prefrontal areas for planning and language
functions (Leiner, Leiner & Dow [10]). Leiner, Leiner and
Dow proposed that the evolutionarily differentiated devel-
opment of the newer parts of the dentate nucleus of the
cerebellum enabled the brain to unconsciously manipulate
ideas and their communication with great dexterity just as
the phylogenetically older portions of the dentate nucleus
had done for motor skills. Today, such unconscious ma-
nipulation of ideas is referred to as unconscious processes
in working memory [1, 27].
Leiner, Leiner and Dow’s [9, 10] foregoing early spec-
ulations and hypothesis concerning the cognitive func-
tions of the cerebellum have been strongly supported
by literally hundreds of brain-imaging and clinical stud-
ies. Among such studies particularly relevant to the
present article are the following: Akshoomoff et al. [3];
Balsters, Whalen, Robertson et al. [28]; Ito [7, 8]; Leggio
and Molinari [4]; Liao, Kronemer, Yau et al. [29]; Marvel
and Desmond [30, 31]: Schmahmann [32]; Stoodley,
Valera and Schmahmann [33]; Strick, Dum and Fiez [34];
Vandervert [1].
Figure 1 illustrates the enormous, 69 billion-neuron
computational capacity of the cerebellum compared to
16 billion neurons in the cerebral cortex [35] that is
proposed have been and continues to be behind the evo-
lution of uniquely human culture. As Leiner, Leiner and
Dow [9] argued three decades ago, critically important
in this relationship has been the evolutionary expansion
of the cerebellum’s dentate nucleus:
In the human brain, the dentate nucleus has become
enormous, both when compared to other cerebellar
nuclei and when compared with its size in other
species…Its increase in size developed in parallel
with the enlargement of the cerebral cortex and
cerebellar cortex. (p. 444)
The dentate nucleus is composed of a phylogenetically
older motor loop (dorsal dentate) and a cognitive loop
(ventral dentate). In humans, the ventral dentate is twice
as large as the dorsal dentate and is proportionately larger
than that of the great apes (Bostan, Dum & Strick [36]).
Marvel and Desmond [30] suggested that the ventral
dentate (cognitive loop) was naturally selected from the
evolutionarily older dorsal dentate (motor) as the cerebellar
cortex and frontal areas of cerebral cortex expanded over
the last million years. The ventral dentate of the cerebellum
outputs to the frontal and parietal areas of the cerebral
cortex (working memory, executive functions including
planning, and rule-based learning [7, 9, 34]. Through the
dentate nucleus, then, the cerebellum is involved in the
learning of countless internal models which are sent to the
cerebral cortex for both motor and cognitive processing.
Based on extensive research studies, Bostan, Dum and
Strick [36] argued that the “signal from the dentate to the
prefrontal and posterior parietal areas of the cortex [work-
ing memory, executive functions and rule-based learning]
is as important to their function as the signal the nucleus
sends to motor areas of the cerebral cortex” (p. 3). Thus, as
a 69 billion neuron-strong computational system based on
sequence detection and prediction (Leggio & Molinari [4]),
the human cerebellum wields an “unconscious presence”
in thought, behavior and affect that is commensurate with
the immense learning requirements and apparently unlim-
ited potential of the experience and products of culture.
The collaborative roles of the cerebellum and the
cerebral cortex in socialization toward the norms
of culture
Doya [12] rigorously laid out the differences between the
computational architectures of the cerebral cortex and
the cerebellum. He argued that (1) the computational
role of the cerebral cortex is context-dependent, essen-
tially managing survival and maintenance operations in
the conscious here-and-now context, and (2) the com-
putational role of the cerebellum, on the other hand, is
“context-independent,” which means, in accordance with
Leggio and Molinari [4], the cerebellum learns internal
Fig. 1 The number of neurons in the cerebellum versus the number
in the cerebral cortex. Neuron count data from: Lent et.al. [35]
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models of control that by-pass the rigorous relearning of
the requirements of here-and-now contexts by establish-
ing feedforward models of behavior and thought to
unconsciously predict, anticipate and deal with those re-
petitive situations. These context-independent computa-
tions produce forward-predicting cerebellar internal
models which enable skillful, error-corrected manipula-
tive control in everything from, for example, skillful
sports performance to expert piano performance to the
creative ideas and innovations that result from repetitive
experience in science, religion, mathematics, art, music,
daily routines and social relationships (Vandervert [1];
Vandervert, Schimpf & Liu [37]).
How, exactly, are we to understand Doya’s [12] ana-
lysis of these different but completely integrated roles of
the cerebral cortex and the cerebellum? What does
“context-independent” mean, how does it come about
and to what does it apply? As described earlier in the
Introduction section of this article, Akshoomoff,
Courchesne and Townsend [3] and Leggio and Molinari
[4] independently proposed that the cerebellum does
indeed specialize in learning of unconscious, forward-
predicting internal models that are sent to working
memory and other sensory, motor and affective pro-
cesses in the cerebral cortex. Akshoomoff, Courchesne
and Townsend [3] described important detail on how
the cerebellum builds a predictive, unconscious structure
into its internal models:
The cerebellum is a master computational system
that adjusts responsiveness in a variety of networks
to obtain a prescribed goal [in Baddeley’s working
memory model, this is the attentional control of the
central executive] (Courchesne, 1995; Courchesne
et al., 1994). These networks include those thought
to be involved in declarative memory, working
memory, attention, arousal, affect, language, speech,
homeostasis, and sensory modulation as well as
motor control. This may require the cerebellum
to implement a succession of precisely timed and
selected changes in the pattern or level of neural
activity in these diverse networks [It would do this
by learning internal models that would implement
such changes.]. We hypothesized that the cerebellum
does this by encoding (“learning”) temporally ordered
sequences of multi-dimensional information about
external and internal events (effector, sensory, affective,
mental, autonomic), and, as similar sequences of
external and internal events unfold, they elicit a readout
of the full sequence in advance of the real-time events.
This readout is sent to and alters, in advance [italics
added], the state of each motor, sensory, autonomic,
attentional, memory, or affective system which,
according to the previous “learning” of this sequence,
will soon be actively involved in the current real-time
events. So, in contrast to conscious, longer time-
scale anticipatory processes mediated by cerebral
systems, output of the cerebellum provides moment-
to-moment, unconscious, very short time-scale,
anticipatory information. (pp. 592–593)
It is important to note here that attentional control as
used in the context of this article refers to its learning
within working memory in cerebellar internal models as
described in the above quote by Akshoomoff, Courchesne
and Townsend—see also Vandervert [1] in this regard.
Thus combining Doya’s [12] description of the differ-
ences between the computational architectures of the
cerebral cortex and the cerebellum with Akshoomoff,
Courchesne and Townsend’s above cerebellar sequence
detection, “context-independent” refers to internal models
learned in the cerebellum that replace the original context
of repetitious learning required of any tasks, including dif-
ficult, time-consuming, higher-order cognitive tasks and
task related to complex social interaction (the original
“contexts”). For example, in relation to the original, often
arduous context-dependent process of learning a complex
musical piece, “context-independent” does not mean
independent of the musical piece in question but rather
independent of the original difficult, repetitive learning
tasks that have been replaced by a template of internal
models (neural circuits) in the cerebellum. In regard to
such higher-order and social tasks, see particularly Doya
([12], p. 671); Akshoomoff, Courchesne & Townsend’s [3]
above-quoted listing of declarative memory, working,
attention, arousal, affect and so on; Leggio & Molinari’s
[4] above-quoted listing of “inferences of higher-order
processes,” and “other persons” as controlled objects. As
an example of the learning of context-independent in-
ternal models for these highest levels of thinking, Ito [7]
provided a straightforward discussion on how the cerebel-
lum might learn internal models of complex mental
models taking place in the parietolateral association area
and then forwards them back to the cerebral cortex to
carry out the original context-dependent task in an error-
corrected and unconscious manner.
It is proposed that, through cerebrocerebellar collabor-
ation, these context-independent cerebellar internal
models provide the basis for both the unconscious learn-
ing of and ongoing participation in culture. The powerful
adaptive value of such context-independent internal
models in culture is twofold: (1) they enable humans to
collectively think or perform faster, more appropriately
and more consistently in a predictive, feedforward man-
ner (Akshoomoff, Courchesne & Townsend [3]; Ito [7];
Leggio & Molinari [4]; Vandervert [1, 2], and (2) increas-
ingly adaptive and increasingly complex mental models
and movements connected to complex ongoing social
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and technological problems with a culture can be cre-
atively developed though the blending of cerebellar in-
ternal models in the individual (Imamizu, Higuchi, Toda
& Kawato [5]; Vandervert [1]; Vandervert, Schimpf &
Liu [37]. Individuals then share the products of their
new, creative blends of cerebellar internal models (new
ideas, new technologies and so forth) with other mem-
bers of culture, thus advancing culture as a whole. These
new ideas and technologies in turn give rise to additional
new creative blends of cerebellar internal, thus continu-
ally advancing culture (often rapidly in the manner of a
positive feedback loop) to higher social, scientific,
technological, and artistic levels. An example of the
optimization of mental/manual skill (point 1 above) in
many individuals throughout culture can be seen clearly
in the process of learning cerebellar internal models
through years of repetitive practice leading to errorless
and seemingly effortless complex musical performance
(Vandervert [1]). Recall, that “context-independent” does
not mean independent of the musical piece in question,
but rather independent of the original difficult, repetitive
learning tasks that have been replaced by a template of
internal models3. So, now, the pianist, for example, plays
a complex concerto errorlessly without “thinking” about
the original contexts of the practice sessions (see, for ex-
ample, Parsons, Sergent, Hodges et al. [38]). The leading
edge and heart of a culture is made up of many such
highly-practiced individuals across all components of
culture, religion, science, art, engineering, music, tech-
nology and so on. And, it is proposed that examples of
the constant, cumulative advance of ever-new blends of
internal models and thus the advance of culture (point 2
above) include the cumulative growth of agricultural
methods, the relentless technological and artistic ad-
vances of ancient Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, and on
into the likewise relentless technological and artistic ad-
vances of the modern world.
The observational learning of cerebellar internal-
models provides the “glue” for socialization
toward the norms of culture
In the sharing of the above cumulative advance of new,
creative blends of cerebellar internal models across indi-
viduals, observational learning is critically important. Ob-
servational learning is learning that occurs by observing
the behavior of others. Observational learning is critically
important during socialization today (see Endnotes), but
was even more important among ancient peoples where
the bulk of socialization occurred, not in schools with
books and computers, but in everyday community and
family activities (including often-repeated religious/polit-
ical ceremonies and rituals) and in occupational appren-
ticeships. How are cerebellar internal models acquired
through observational learning, and, specifically, how are
they accumulated in a person-to-person manner that
leads to advances in culture?
In this regard, Wolpert, Doya and Kawato [15] pro-
posed that a high level of “control” and observational
learning related to the nonverbal behavior and intentions
of others can be based on cerebellar internal models of
one’s own motor system:
We hypothesize that…during action observation the
[one’s own] motor system can be used to understand
the actions of others. This could be an efficient
process because our CNS has learned to predict the
consequences of actions on our own body [as a
collection of controlled objects] and this can be used
to make accurate predictions about others. (p. 597)
In this hypothesized scenario, the cerebellum is in-
volved in a combination of a high level of “control” and
observational learning of the behavior of another person.
Recall from the discussion of “controlled objects” in the
introduction of this article that in the above scenario the
observed person would be a controlled object in the
same sense that a person’s own arm is a controlled ob-
ject manipulated by internal models in the cerebellum.
Along this same line of observational or imitative learn-
ing, cerebellum research has outlined detailed accounts of
how internal models of communication between speakers
and listeners and in the imitation of others operate in (1)
advanced social interaction at the symbolic level (Wolpert,
Doya & Kawato [15]), (2) higher-level, mutual mental
modeling between speaker and listener during social inter-
action (Imamizu & Kawato [13]), and (3) the comprehen-
sion of sentences between speaker and listener (Moberget
Gullsden, Andersson et al. [14]).
Following directly in this line of research, Doya [12]
proposed that the cerebellum learns internal models for
words and gestures between speaker and listener:
In the context of communication, the “environment”
is the partner [the listener] of communication and the
goal is to bring the physical or internal state of the
partner into a desired state. This involves sequential
selection of actions, i.e. words or gestures [italics added],
in an appropriate sequence, in the same way as in the
case of many control tasks. When the model of the
partner is available [for example, a close friend or a
familiar teacher], the goal can be achieved more
readily and quickly. If the internal models of the
speaker [italics added] and listener [italics added]
are similar, communication [and, thus observational
learning] is made efficient. (pp. 970–971)
While not all observational learning includes such
speaker/listener modeling, most family, school, religious
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learning, apprentice situations and so forth occurring
during socialization into the norms of culture do. It is
important to note in this regard, that in situations where
there is a good degree of one-sided or one-way commu-
nication (for example, teachers presenting lessons to stu-
dents without interaction, children watching television
or listening to parent conversations, and so forth) the
listener would experience a diminished degree of the
learning of forward-predictive cerebellar internal models
of the “speaker.” This is so, because as compared to two-
way communication, these one-way situations permit
cerebellar internal models to test and error-correct dimin-
ished samples of the speaker’s (or television program’s)
behavior and mental state(s).
It is proposed that it is cerebellar internal models,
learned largely through observational learning and in
accordance with Leggio and Molinari’s [4] earlier above-
quoted sequence detection process that provide the
substance and “glue” that binds individuals together in
both the experience and capacity to participate in a
common culture. Without the concepts initiated by
cerebellar internal models through repetitious learning
of common tasks in each individual’s brain, there would
be no conscious/unconscious common framework to
bind the members of culture together in a “silent” fash-
ion, again, for example, in art, science, religion, music,
mathematics, politics, child-rearing and so on. The ex-
pression that members of culture are bound together in
a “silent” fashion is used here to draw attention to this
important point that Leiner, Leiner and Dow [10] made
on the unconscious nature of learning in the cerebellum:
Cerebellar signals are always generated below the
level of conscious awareness in the brain. How
cerebellar contributions can improve the speed
and skill of cerebral performance is therefore not
accessible to conscious introspection. Rather, the
cerebellar contributions to cognitive and language
skills would constitute a part of what is called ‘the
cognitive unconscious.’ (p. 1006)
Important implications of the prominent role of
the cerebellum in the learning of culture
In summary to this point, it is proposed that the learning
of the components of culture can best be understood
and studied as the learning of a general template of cere-
bellar internal models. This template of cerebellar in-
ternal models unconsciously controls the focus, shifting,
and duration of attention in working memory, affect and
so forth as it is shared as “moment-to-moment, uncon-
scious, very short time-scale, anticipatory information”
(Akshoomoff, Courchesne, Townsend ([3], p. 593), see
their earlier above quote) among the members of culture.
Following Baddeley [39], these parameters of attention
provide executive control for ongoing thought including
constant, ongoing access to cultural information held in
long-term memory.
Cultural deprivation and cultural shifts, and the
cerebellar cognitive affective syndrome
This view of the cerebellum’s role in the learning of cul-
ture offers a way to study the effects of cultural practices,
cultural changes, and importantly, cultural deprivation
and maltreatment on the development of working mem-
ory, and, as Ito [7] described, how those changes might
affect both normal and abnormal mental and affective
development:
In analogy to the contribution of the cerebellum to
motor activity, its contribution to mental activity may
be specified as regulating the speed, consistency, and
appropriateness of cognitive processes, with dysfunction
leading to a dysmetria of thought (Schmahmann [40]).
This provides theoretical bases for explaining cerebellar
symptoms such as dysmetria as being due to
impairment of a cerebellar model of musculoskeletal
system. A similar explanation applies to mental
dysmetria [italics added] that may occur due to
lack of the [cerebellar internal] model which copies
a mental model [of the cerebral cortex]. (p. 486)
Specifically, Schmahmann [18] proposed, that such
dysfunction of the cerebrocerebellar circuits/functions
produces dysmetria of thought with the following mental
and affective characteristics:
It [the cerebellar cognitive affective syndrome] is
characterized by (1) disturbances of executive function,
which includes deficient planning, set-shifting, abstract
reasoning, working memory, and decreased verbal
fluency; (2) impaired spatial cognition, including
visual-spatial disorganization and impaired visual-
spatial memory; (3) personality change characterized
by flattening or blunting of affect and disinhibited or
inappropriate behavior; and (4) linguistic difficulties,
including dysprosodia, agrammatism and mild anomia.
The net effect of these disturbances in cognitive
functioning was a general lowering of overall intellectual
function [italics added]. (Schmahmann [18], p. 371
It is proposed that these functions are importantly re-
lated to the early development of mental and affective
components of communication (language and nonverbal
communication) (a la Doya’s [12] above quote) by which,
to a large degree, culture is transmitted. This idea is sup-
ported by Knickmeyer, Gouttard, Kang, Evans, Wilber,
Smith et al. [41] who argued that the 240 % increase in
the size of the cerebellum in the first year suggested the
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great sensitivity of the cerebellum to experience during
the first year and on into the school years:
Because the cerebellum is critically involved in motor
coordination and balance [42] the striking cerebellar
growth may underpin the rapid motor developments
of infancy. The cerebellum has also been implicated
in a plethora of other cognitive abilities including
planning, set-shifting, language abilities, abstract
reasoning, working memory [italics added], and visual-
spatial organization [italics added] [17]. Given that
“cognitive” regions of the cerebellum have reciprocal
projections with nonprimary frontal, parietal, and
occipital association cortex [43], the extremely
rapid growth of the cerebellum in the first year
may be a prerequisite for specific aspects of later
cortical development. ([41], p. 12180)
It is therefore suggested that through a number of types
and degrees of cultural deprivation the functions listed in
Schmahmann’s above cerebellar cognitive affective syn-
drome may be impaired during socialization/enculturation
(see Endnotes).
Cultural deprivation impairs the acquisition of
social cues
Studies on the effects of socialization on the develop-
ment of the cerebellum have offered preliminary support
for this suggestion. For example, Bauer, Hanson, Pierson
et al. [44] studied the effects of cultural deprivation on
the development of the cerebellum and cognitive func-
tions of young children in austere orphanages4. This
research found that orphanage-induced social/cultural
deprivation resulted in significantly smaller left and right
superior-posterior cerebellar lobe volumes and, cogni-
tively, reduced visual-spatial memory and reduced atten-
tional and planning components of executive function.
In addition, Baldacara, Jackowski, Schoedl et al. [45]
also found that emotional maltreatment during such
institution-induced socialization leads to reduced cerebel-
lar volume and to various degrees of the “flattening or
blunting of affect and disinhibited or inappropriate behav-
ior” cited among the symptoms of dysmetria of thought
by Schmahmann [18] above.
Corroborative evidence that the cerebellum is the key
driver of socialization and, thereby, enculturation also
comes from an unexpected source. Giedd [46] pointed
out that electronic media (television, cellphones, the
Internet, etc.) have changed the way children and ado-
lescents learn, play, and socialize more in the last
15 years than in the previous 570 some years since the
introduction of Gutenberg’s printing press. Because the
increase in the use of these media (mostly television, see
Rideout, Foehr and Roberts [47]) have dramatically
changed learning, play, and socialization among chil-
dren, it represents a definite and significant cultural
modification or “shift.” The actual existence of this sug-
gested cultural shift is strongly supported by a prepon-
derance of findings that, much like Bauer et al.’s [44]
and Baldacara et al.’s [45] above-cited social/cultural
deprivation-induced effects, excessive television viewing
among children produces what might be considered
mild, parallel appearances of Schmahmann’s [18] cere-
bellar cognitive affective syndrome. For example, studies
on both excessive and specialized aspects of television
viewing have found that those same (but less pronounced)
negative attentional, executive, and affective effects occur
(Lillard & Peterson [48, 49]; Pagani, Fitzpatrick & Barnett
[50]; Watt, Fitzpatrick, Derevensky et al. [51]). As Bauer
et al. [44] and Baldacara et al. [45] found for institutional
deprivation, these researchers suggested that excessive
television viewing deprives young children of critical
developmental socialization and peer-interactive play
activities.
Learning to be a bystander: excessive television
viewing reduces the Cerebellum’s learning of
other-persons-as-control-objects
All of the foregoing research concludes that the negative
effects of both institutional deprivation and excessive
television viewing are the result of reduced opportunities
for hands-on socialization. But how, exactly, does this
reduced socialization occur in the brain? Within the
framework of cerebellar internal models described in this
article, it is suggested that these negative socialization
effects are not only the result of the learning of a lessened
degree of socialization but also the result of the learning
of internal models for a different kind of socialization. Al-
though this suggestion of a different kind of socialization
can apply in either institutional deprivation or excessive
television viewing, an example will be given only for the
case of excessive television viewing. Again returning to
Doya’s [12] and Wolpert et al’s [15] above notion of
speaker and listener-as-control-objects in interpersonal
language and nonverbal communication, it is proposed
that when a child watches characters in scenarios on tele-
vision (either cartoon characters or actual persons) they
are still learning cerebellar internal models related to
“socialization,” but with increased television viewing it is
increasingly a one-sided or “bystander” template of in-
ternal models that is being learned rather than one of a
socially richer two-sided interaction. This television-
mediated, one-sided socialization is less demanding of the
unconscious learning of cerebellar control models (for
example, requires less hands-on social give-and-take com-
munication and eye-contact) in the control of attention,
executive control, and affect as described by Akshoomoff,
et al. [3]. This occurs in television viewing it is suggested,
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because the other “person(s)” are either more predictable
because television plots are very similar, or their behavior
and thoughts need not be predicted at all because there
are no real-world consequences if the television viewer
does not learn to predict them (see Leggio & Molinari’s
[4] quote on cerebellar predictive sequence detection
above). In fact, the other persons or cartoon characters
seen in television programming may be more entertaining,
because they are not predictable, or prediction is elusive5.
In essence, today’s children in varying degrees are
learning to be a part of a “media-mediated” culture that
is quite different from that of previous generations. They
are learning to become a part of the rapidly emerging
electronic media culture described above by Giedd [46].
As Giedd suggested, some of the effects of what in this
article is called one-sided socialization are positive (for
example, in opening new horizons of information access)
and some are negative (as in lowering attentional control,
school grades, and social adjustment as found by Lillard
et al. [48, 49], Pagani et al. [50] and Watt et al. [51]. It is
proposed that the negative effects are the result of mild
impairment of the development of implicit learning via
cerebellar internal models as described by Ito [8], leading
to an equally mild, parallel development of Schmahmann’s
[18] cerebellar cognitive affective syndrome (see compo-
nent characteristics listed earlier above). This contention
is supported by D’Mello and Stoodley’s [52] in comments
on the role of cerebellar internal model in implicit
learning, especially in early development:
Abnormal connectivity between the cerebellum and
cerebral motor regions might result in sub-optimal
automatization and modulation of motor behaviors, and
might also be related to delayed acquisition of gestures
important for social interaction and communication.
Similarly, abnormal connectivity between the cerebellum
and cerebral cortical regions involved in language could
lead to atypical organization of language networks in
ASD (autism spectrum disorder), and be associated
with delayed language acquisition in ASD. (p. 13)
Conclusions and discussion
It is concluded that the essential components of culture
are learned and sustained not by the cerebral cortex
alone as many traditionally believe, but are substantially
learned in cerebellar internal models through repetitious
experience. Following Akshoomoff, et al. [3]; Imamizu,
Higuchi, Toda & Kawato [5]; Ito [7, 8, 53, 54] and Leggio
& Molinari [4] these cerebellar internal models were
adaptive because, (‘1) by encoding (“learning”) temporally
ordered sequences of multi-dimensional information
about external and internal events, they predicted future
events in advance, (2) through constant error-correction,
they regulated the speed, consistency, and appropriateness
of movement and thought in the cerebral cortex, and (3)
when confronting new tasks, they are blended to provide
new solutions. It is further concluded that, in the process
of socialization (see Endnotes), these cerebellar internal
models are largely derived through observational learning
from communication (including gestures) shared among
members of a particular group of people a la Doya,
[12], Imamizu & Kawato, [13], Moberget et al. [14], and
Wolpert et al. [15]. These internal models are generated
below the level of conscious awareness (Leiner, Leiner &
Dow [10]), and, it is suggested, are responsible for predict-
ing behavioral and cognitive requirements necessary in
the origin of culture, for the participation in culture, and
the forward advance of culture.
The cerebellar approach to the nature and origins of cul-
ture offers the following new explanations for a number of
important questions.
First, by recognizing that all people learn similar cere-
bellar internal models to similar repeated acts and expe-
riences (Ito [7]; Leggio & Molinari [4]), the cerebellar
approach explains how the components of culture, al-
though observed in others and taught by others, can be
unconsciously learned by each person, but yet be learned
to be in close sync with others of the same group. That is,
the unconscious learning of cerebellar internal models
through speaker-listener communication (including non-
verbal communication [Doya [12]) reduces a myriad of
similar environmental/social circumstances to predictive,
error-adjusted (Leggio and Molinari [4]) social principles
which drive social thought, behavior and affect in a
similar manner in all members of the social group.
Second, the larger anthropological context for the evo-
lution of the origin of human culture now appears to have
been the adaptive natural selection of sequence-based
(rule-based) cognitive processes required in the natural
selection of the manufacture and use of stone tools
beginning some one and a half million years ago (e.g.,
Barton & Venditti, [55]; Greenfield, [56]; Leiner, Leiner
& Dow, [9, 10]; Stout & Chaminade, [24]; Vandervert,
[1, 11, 57, 58]). Because of its requirement of prolonged
cognitive effort, this adaptive selection advantage of
stone-tool manufacture and use likely selected toward
the three- to fourfold expansion of the size of the cere-
bellum and, and especially its cognitive, working mem-
ory functions, which Leiner et al. [9] referred to as “the
skillful manipulation of ideas” (p. 444). Within this
context of adaptively evolving cerebrocerebellar feedback
loops and the slowly accelerating complexity of stone-tool
production (Ambrose, [59]), it is proposed that the earliest
shared, highly-repetitive, sequential motor/cognitive activity
necessary for a cerebellum-driven “culture” would have
likely developed. This offers a cerebellum internal models-
based explanation for how culture could have originated
out of mutually-shared observational learning related to the
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tool-manufacturing and tool-using other persons-as-
control-objects (Doya, [12]). It is suggested that, within
this highly-repetitive, sequential activity and based on the
blending of cerebellar internal models (Imamizu et al. [5])
was the beginning of a positive feedback loop (what was
learned and produced in turn led to greater, more refined
learning and production). This scenario compares directly
with anthropologist Ralph Holloway’s brain-culture posi-
tive feedback loop ([20], pp. 293–295).
Third, Vandervert [1, 2, 57] and Vandervert, Schimpf
and Liu [37] described an evolutionary scenario that (1)
cerebellar internal models are blended in the process of
optimizing problem solving in working memory (Imamizu
et al. [5]; Ito, [49]; Yomogida, Sugiura, Watanabe et al.
[60]), and (2) that when these newly blended internal
models are sent to consciousness in the prefrontal execu-
tive and parietolateral association cortices (working mem-
ory areas) (Ito, [53]), they may be experienced as sudden,
intuitive new solutions to problems. Within the larger
context of the first point above, this offers an explanation
not only for individual creativity but the constant creative,
forward advance of culture as a whole (Vandervert,
[2, 57]; Vandervert, Schimpf & Liu [37]).
Fourth, Vandervert [11] proposed that within the con-
text of gradually more adaptive manufacture and use of
stone tools (especially the last million years) that cere-
bellar internal models adaptively blended (Imamizu et al.
[5]; Yomogida et al. [60]) visual-spatial working memory
with vocalizations to produce symbolic, syntactical lan-
guage6. According to Vandervert [11], this latter adaptation
was the basis of the evolution of Baddeley’s phonological
loop from the existing, pre-language visual-spatial working
memory in earlier Homo erectus. It is suggested that the
evolution of this new symbolic level of communication
produced more readily communicated (a la Doya [12]) de-
tails of ongoing socially shared experience. This idea is
strongly supported by Van Overwalle and Marien's [16]
conclusion that the cerebellum learns internal models for
moment-to-moment, predictive “fluent and automatic so-
cial interaction” (p. 16). Vandervert [11] suggested that the
foregoing cerebro-cerebellar blending of (1) a sequence-
driven, decomposed visual-spatial experience with (2) vo-
calizations likewise selectively decomposed toward lan-
guage led to a highly adaptive, infinitely partitionable7
internal model input (language) into working memory.
That is, the gradual emergence of an infinitely partitionable
working memory, and, at the same time, a socially sharable
working memory, a la Van Overwalle and Marien's above
“fluent and automatic social interaction,” would have been
an enormous selective advantage. It is suggested that this
adaptive selection, shared through the emerging phono-
logical loop a la Doya [12], offers an explanation of the
adaptive beginning of culture as a sharable, infinitely parti-
tionable reality within working memory. It seems only
sequence-detecting, error-driven cerebellar internal models
(Leggio & Molinari, [4]), in collaboration with the advance
human cerebral cortex, had uniquely evolved to produce
such an outcome.
Fifth, the cerebrocerebellar approach to the origin and
nature of culture described herein offers a brain-based
explanation of how excessive television viewing (a pro-
found cultural shift which has occurred Giedd, [46];
Rideout, Foehr and Roberts [47]) especially among chil-
dren, might disrupt traditional, pre-television, two-sided
socialization which Lillard et al. [48], Pagnani et al. [50]
and Watt et al. [51] found reduces attentional control,
school grades, and social adjustment. This explanation
proposes that excessive television viewing diminishes so-
cial interaction with other-persons-as-cerebellar-control-
objects (a la Doya, [12]; Imamizu & Kawato, [13];
Moberget et al. [14]; Wolpert et al. [15]) and replaces
“other persons” with non-interactive (and therefore in-
consequential) “persons,” and thereby reduces the repeti-
tious or implicit aspect of observational learning. It is
suggested that this results in the learning of cerebellar
internal models for a one-sided socialization that is similar
in effect to that of socially abused children raised in socially
austere orphanages (non-interactive caretakers, little play)
found by Bauer et al. [44]. As D’Mello and Stoodley [52]
suggested for implicit motor and cognitive learning espe-
cially during the early developmental years, it is further
proposed, that this one-sided, unconscious learning of
cerebellar internal models results in diminished learning of
attentional, executive, and affective functions, in other
words, a mild, parallel learned version of Schmahmann’s
[18] cerebellar cognitive affective syndrome.
In summary it is concluded that culture is a collaborative
outcome of the cerebral cortex and the cerebellum. It is
hypothesized that the cerebellum, through the evolutionary
differentiation of its dentate nucleus toward cognitive func-
tions including working memory and language [9, 10, 30, 36],
plays the more prominent role in the learning, mainten-
ance, and advance of culture. It is suggested that Ito’s [8]
conception of the “implicit self” (learned through repetition
below the level of conscious awareness) is embedded within
the proposed largely cerebellum-driven model of culture.
Endnotes
1Culture is defined [here] as the shared patterns of
behaviors and interactions, cognitive constructs, and
affective understandings that are learned through a
process of socialization [italics added]. These shared pat-
terns identify the members of a culture group while also
distinguishing those of another group. Source: Center
for Advanced Research on Language Acquisition (http://
www.carla.umn.edu/culture/definitions.html).
Socialization is defined by Sensoy and DiAngelo [61] as
follows: “Socialization refers to our systematic training
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into the norms of our culture. Socialization is the
process of learning the meanings and practices that en-
able us to make sense of and behave appropriately in
that culture” (p. 15).
2The computational role of the cerebellum is to
learn “context-independent” internal models (Doya [12]),
which means it learns internal models of control that
by-pass the rigorous, constant relearning of the require-
ments of repetitive here-and-now contexts of the cere-
bral cortex. It does this by unconsciously learning
feedforward models of behavior and thought to predict,
anticipate and, though error-correction, optimally deal
with those repetitive situations (Leggio & Molinari [4]).
3Music training, by the very nature of its cognitive,
affective and manual production requirements, draws
heavily on the components and capacities of working
memory. Broadly, working memory is the capacity to
temporarily maintain and subsequently manipulate in-
formation “online” in the pursuit of goal-oriented tasks
(see, for example, Baddeley [62]). In music training for
the piano, for example, these working memory tasks in-
clude reading the musical notation system and sustaining
the highly attentive repetitious practice required to learn
the transfer of this notation into sequences of bimanual
production, the latter of which depends on multisensory
feedback. Through practice these rigorous context-
dependent requirements are by-passed by the learning of
cerebellar “context-independent” internal models.
4The level of social austerity in orphanage institutions
varies greatly. However, the institutions in these studies
were generally characterized by unfavorable child-to-
caregiver ratios, regimented daily living routines, and di-
minished sensory, cognitive, and language stimulation,
and diminished social responsiveness of caregivers.
5Learning internal models of other-persons (or cartoon
characters)-as-control-objects that don’t predict future be-
havioral or mental requirements may seem to contradict
Akshoomoff et al’s [3] and Leggio and Molinari’s [4] pro-
posals that the cerebellum’s mode operation is to predict.
However, all functions of working memory are aimed at
and honed (by the repetitive learning of error-correcting
cerebellar internal models) toward the accomplishment of
a prescribed goal (Cowan, [63]; Fuster, [64]; Miyake &
Shaw, [65]) formulated, not just in the cerebellum, but in
the history of collaboration of the cerebral cortex and the
cerebellum. This includes imaginary scenarios as goals
(for example, Yomogida et al. [60]). Therefore, a pro-
spective goal in working memory may be to achieve
pure fantasy in science fiction novels, television shows
or cartoons (where common sense and the laws of
physics are humorously or interestingly violated). In the
case of such fantasy in working memory, cerebellar in-
ternal models are honed toward the prospective goals
of the imagined “logic” of the story.
6This evolutionary blending of visual-spatial working
memory with vocalization is generally supported by Liao,
Kronemer, Yau, Desmond and Marvel [29] who demon-
strated that the motor cortex and superior cerebellum
are involved in the rehearsal/maintenance of both verbal
and nonverbal (pictorial) content in working memory.
Liao et al. may reasonably be interpreted to reveal how
the original evolution of the adaptive blending of visual-
spatial-related motor and vocal-motor processes remains
an equally adaptive mechanism for the reinforcement of
memory traces during verbal working memory.
7Baddeley [62] suggested a similar evolutionary sce-
nario for working memory: Working memory stands at
the crossroads between memory, attention, and percep-
tion. In the case of the slave systems, the phonological
loop, for example, probably represents an evolution of
the basic speech perception and production systems to
the point at which they can be used for active memory.
(p. 559). Directly following and supporting Baddeley’s
scenario, Vandervert [11] argued that the vocal tagging
and filing in long-term memory during the evolutionary
emergence of the phonological loop was the result of the
following two interrelated contributions of cerebro-
cerebellar collaboration. First, upon encountering new,
challenging environmental demands which pressed the
limits of then-existing stone tool technology, cerebellar
internal models gradually decomposed/re-composed visual-
spatial experience associated with situation-specific actions,
and parallel situation-specific vocalizations into further de-
compositions/re-organizations of cerebellar internal models
(Flanagan et al. [66]; Haruno, Wolpert, and Kawato, [67];
Nakano et al. [68]) which, when blended, selected toward
new, uniquely human syntactic orders of language features.
Second, these new vocal differentiations in evolving visual-
spatial working memory served as an increasingly larger
system of associative internal and social vocal tags (Fuster
[64], pp. 249–251).
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